Federal Reserve : Initiation by fire by Charles Gerena
W
alking down the marble
hallways of the Eccles
Building, Ben Bernanke
follows in the footsteps of the previ-
ous Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, Alan Greenspan.
Bernanke’s legendary predecessor is a
tough act to follow, but it’s easy to for-
get that Greenspan had big shoes to
fill when he stepped into the
Chairman role in August 1987.
Paul Volcker, with his 6-foot-7-inch
stature and forceful personality,
earned the respect of central bankers
and financial markets around the
world. From 1979 to 1987, Volcker took
aim at the double-digit price growth
plaguing the U.S. economy and
wringed out excess dollars from the
money supply, even if such actions had
short-run recessionary consequences.
His determination secured the pub-
lic’s confidence that the Fed would
protect price stability, helping to
reverse inflation expectations that had
built up during the 1960s and ’70s. 
Like Volcker, Greenspan focused
on inflation. He expressed this posi-
tion several times during his July 1987
Senate confirmation hearing. In a
response to one senator’s question
about what he thought appropriate
targets for monetary policy should be,
Greenspan noted that the Fed’s pri-
mary goal is to “set an environment in
which steady long-term maximum
economic growth is feasible in our
economy.” In meeting that goal, the
Fed needed to be very careful not to
“allow the inflation genie out of the
bottle, because that will clearly under-
cut that goal.”
A week after taking office,
Greenspan immediately acted against
inflationary pressures. But his offen-
sive would be put on hold after Black
Monday, Oct. 19, 1987. The Dow Jones
Industrial Average plummeted 508
points, or 23 percent. Greenspan’s
response would be a precursor to how
the Fed would deal with a crisis of con-
fidence in financial markets. It would
also stir debate over how monetary
policy should be conducted during a
crisis and how much discretion a Fed
Chairman should have in general.
Into the Valley 
The macroeconomic conditions that
Greenspan inherited from Volcker
were less volatile than what Volcker
faced when he became Fed Chairman
in 1979. 
Year-to-year changes in the
Consumer Price Index had reached a
high of 11.3 percent after wildly fluctu-
ating during the 1970s, while Fed
credibility at keeping inflation stable
had reached a low. Over the next few
years, Volcker worked to reduce the
amount of money and credit available
and rebuild confidence in the Fed’s
inflation-fighting resolve, which even-
tually reduced people’s expectations
of future price increases. 
By 1987, the annual rate of inflation
had fallen to 3.6 percent. It was up to
Greenspan to maintain the Fed’s
restored credibility and use it to 
manage inflation expectations. 
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though. Oil prices nearly doubled
between 1986 and 1987, and the unem-
ployment rate was falling. Neither
factor alone would have automatically
pushed up average price levels, since
competitive pressures often prevent
companies from passing along higher
input costs, and there was only mixed
evidence of resurging inflation at the
time. Still, bond prices dropped and
long-term interest rates on mortgages
and other loans soared during the first
half of 1987. 
“There was some concern at the
time that the economy was over-
heated, and some fear that inflation
[was] drifting back up and the progress
that Volcker had made in getting it
down would prove to be temporary,”
recalls Benjamin Friedman, a
Harvard University economist who
has studied monetary and fiscal
policy.
Meanwhile, fiscal policy wasn’t
doing much to assuage inflation
fears. Tax cuts and increased 
government spending produced
large federal budget deficits.
While Greenspan was widely
considered to be the best choice, it
was a tough job to replace “Tall
Paul.” Greenspan was an unknown
quantity as a monetary policymaker
in the eyes of central bankers and
financial market participants over-
seas. While appointees to the
Board of Governors were usually
macroeconomists from the banking
and securities industries, his under-
standing of the economy came from
his work as a corporate consultant and
a director on the boards of manufac-
turers like Alcoa and General Foods.
“He was a crackerjack domestic
nonfinancial economist, intimately
familiar with the data stream on the
present and future prospects of the
industrial sector in America. But
[being Fed Chairman] was a financial
job, with both national and interna-
tional dimensions, and he would have
some work to do to come up to speed,”
wrote David McClain in his 1988 book
Apocalypse on Wall Street. McClain
served as senior staff economist for
the Council of Economic Advisers
during the Carter administration. 
While it honed Greenspan’s ability
to reach a consensus among people 
of differing viewpoints, his political
experience counted against him as
well. After serving as Richard Nixon’s
economic policy adviser during the
1968 presidential campaign, Greenspan
advised Gerald Ford as chairman of
the president’s Council of Economic
Advisers from 1974 to 1977. Later, he
joined President Reagan’s Economic
Policy Advisory Board in 1981 and 
co-chaired his bipartisan commission
on Social Security reform from 1981 
to 1983.
Given these Republican ties, plus
the fact that six out of the seven mem-
bers of the Board of Governors would
be Reagan appointees, some people
labeled Greenspan a political partisan
who wouldn’t have the gumption to
tighten monetary policy if necessary.
“Investors feared that Greenspan
would not be the aggressive inflation
fighter that Volcker had been and that
he might look the other way rather
than squelch inflationary pressures if
that meant slowing the economy
before the November 1988 presiden-
tial election,” McClain notes.
Greenspan quickly disproved this
perception when he took office on
Aug. 11, 1987. At his first meeting of 
the Federal Open Market Committee,
which includes the Board of Gover-
nors, the New York Fed president, and
a rotating group of four other Reserve
Bank presidents, the committee
agreed to lean toward tightening 
policy between August and its next
meeting on Sept. 22 if circumstances
warranted it. This gave Greenspan a
window of opportunity to use his
authority in between FOMC meetings
to initiate small adjustments in the
federal funds rate, the interest that
banks charge each other to lend
reserves. On Sept. 3, the rate moved up
a quarter of a point to a range of 6.75
percent to 7 percent.
The next day, Greenspan persuaded
his fellow members of the Board of
Governors to raise the discount rate
half of a point to 6 percent, the first
increase since April 1984. (In response,
the funds rate rose again to 7.25 per-
cent.) Changes in the discount rate —
the interest that the Federal
Reserve charges to lend reserves to
banks — served as an important sig-
nal to financial markets about the
Fed’s policy intentions because
changes in the funds rate weren’t yet
publicly announced.
Greenspan would soon prove his
mettle in another way. A month
later on Black Monday, Oct. 19, 
he would confront the central
banker’s historical problem as the
provider of liquidity to the financial
system facing a crisis. He would also
demonstrate his willingness to
loosen the Fed’s grip on the money
supply to mitigate threats to the
financial system.
After the Fall
“A stock market crash can patently
increase the credit risk involved in
lending to certain borrowers,”
Greenspan would recall in his February
1988 congressional testimony about
the Oct. 19 crash. “But there can be …
an exaggerated market reaction as well,
based on little hard evidence, that
builds on itself and ultimately affects
borrowers whose creditworthiness has
not been materially impaired by the
drop in equity values. This irrational
component of the demand for liquidity
may reflect concerns that the crisis
could affect the financial system or the
economy more generally.”
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By 1987, the annual rate
of inflation had fallen to 
3.6 percent. It was up to
Greenspan to maintain the
Fed’s restored credibility
and use it to manage 
inflation expectations.
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tional flight to liquidity and safety
with a run on a bank that is fundamen-
tally sound. Before the existence of
deposit insurance, bankers attempted
to calm jittery depositors by putting
cash in their front window. “In a sense,
the Federal Reserve adopted a similar
strategy after Oct. 19” to counteract
market uncertainty, Greenspan noted.
Greenspan was en route to Dallas
to speak at the American Bankers
Association’s annual convention when
the Dow began to plummet. Upon
landing, he rushed to his hotel and
held a conference call with Vice
Chairman Manuel Johnson, who was
in charge of crisis management, and
senior Fed officials. They discussed
the seriousness of the situation — the
Dow’s decline was nearly twice as
sharp as the 12 percent drop during the
infamous crash of 1929, and financial
markets would likely be in panic mode
the next day.
On Tuesday morning, the group
reconvened and agreed to issue a one-
sentence statement in Greenspan’s
name before the markets opened:
“The Federal Reserve, consistent with
its responsibilities as the nation’s 
central bank, affirmed today its readi-
ness to serve as a source of liquidity to
support the economic and financial
system.”
As Greenspan flew back to
Washington — on a private jet sent 
by White House Chief of Staff
Howard Baker — the Fed backed up
that promise. That day and for the
next two weeks, it made millions of
dollars available to banks through its
open market purchases. The purchases
were significant and frequently made
at an earlier time of the day than usual
to assure markets that liquidity was
available. (Later on, the Fed loaned
reserves to banks through its discount
window, which has historically served
as the “lender of last resort.”) As a
result, excess reserves — funds set
aside by banks above the amount
required by the Fed and to clear debits
to their accounts — rose 61 percent
from $967 million on Oct. 21 to $1.6
billion on Nov. 4.
To make sure the additional liquid-
ity in the banking system would 
reach the securities industry, Fed 
officials assured many in the banking
industry that, despite the turmoil, 
the economy remained fundamentally
sound. E. Gerald Corrigan, president
of the New York Fed, spent several
weeks calling Bankers Trust, Bank of
New York, and other large banks to
“encourage” them to lend to brokerage
firms. Corrigan personally knew 
many of the biggest financial players
because the New York Fed conducted
the Federal Reserve’s open market
purchases.
He reminded bankers that it was
their job to assess creditworthiness,
not circle the wagons until the dust
settled. Furthermore, it was in their
interest to keep the financial system
functioning. Greenspan also talked
with financial market officials to calm
them down.
This combination of gentle persua-
sion and reassurance was essential in
the days following Black Monday. By
midday on Tuesday, dozens of stocks
that didn’t attract any buyers stopped
trading on the New York Stock
Exchange, which was on the brink of
closing itself. Meanwhile, the Chicago
Board of Trade and the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange halted trading in
various futures contracts since there
weren’t enough stocks trading to set a
price. Eventually, though, enough 
confidence and impetus to act built up
to prompt someone to do something
— several companies began repurchas-
ing their stock while a number of 
Wall Street firms bought $60 million
in futures contracts. That helped draw
other buyers back into the stock 
market, sending the Dow up 102
points for the day.
The Fed closely monitored market
developments for several days.
Greenspan set up a crisis management
center in his office with Johnson and
other staffers who kept in touch with
Corrigan in New York, other Reserve
Bank presidents around the country,
and market players worldwide. 
Many credit these decisive actions
for restoring confidence and prevent-
ing the stock market decline from
affecting the banking system. For
many people, Black Monday was just a
bad day on Wall Street. In contrast,
stock market crashes in March 1907
and October 1929 precipitated the
failure of financial institutions and led
to broader economic problems.
Even as the Fed did whatever it
could to prevent financial gridlock —
and, according to one report, contem-
plated more serious intervention such
as directly lending to brokerage firms
or guaranteeing payments between
them — Greenspan didn’t want to cre-
ate unrealistic perceptions of the Fed’s
power.  
“If you intervene too much, then
you create expectations that you’re
controlling and shaping things,” says
Donald Kettl, a political science pro-
fessor at the University of
Pennsylvania and author of Leadership
at the Fed. “Greenspan wasn’t sure that
he could do that, and he wasn’t sure
that the Fed should do that if it could.”
Such views, if proved wrong, would
erode the Fed’s credibility and make it
harder to influence market behavior in
the future. It would also create a moral
hazard problem, whereupon investors
factor Fed intervention into their risk
assessments.
In addition to addressing the fear-
induced demand for liquidity,
Greenspan saw the need to counter
risks to the nation’s economic growth.
In his semiannual testimony to the
House Banking Committee on Feb. 23,
1988, he noted that the sudden loss 
in financial wealth and subsequent
erosion of business and consumer 
confidence threatened to reduce
spending. 
So Greenspan persuaded his fellow
members of the FOMC to lower their
target for the federal funds rate from
7.50 percent just before Oct. 19 to a
range of 6.75 percent to 6.88 percent
by mid-November. Greenspan
reduced the rate again to 6.5 percent in
between the FOMC’s meetings in
January and February 1988.
The Fed’s accommodative mone-
tary policy for the five months
following the October 1987 crash
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from spiking as they had done in pre-
vious financial crises. However, it also
“led to higher real economic growth in
1988 and 1989 than most experts had
forecast,” noted William Niskanen,
who served on President Reagan’s
Council of Economic Advisers and is
now chairman of the Cato Institute,
in a recent paper on the Greenspan
era. This forced the Fed to take deci-
sive steps to remove excess liquidity
from the economy and “deflate this
demand bubble.” 
The federal funds rate increased
nine times between March 1988 and
March 1989, moving more than three
percentage points to 9.75 percent. But
it took some time to have the intended
effect — the annual inflation rate
inched upward from 3.6 percent in
1987 to 5.4 percent in 1990 before
receding to 4.2 percent a year later.
The Fed’s success came at a heavy
price. Tighter monetary policy, coin-
ciding with a reluctance to lend
among some banks and anxiety over
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the
United States’ military intervention,
contributed to a recession that lasted
from July 1990 to March 1991.
There is little doubt among macro-
economists that the yearlong string of
increases in the funds rate was neces-
sary to keep inflation in check. But
some would argue that such correc-
tive action wouldn’t have been
required if the Fed hadn’t kept mone-
tary policy so loose for so long after
the crash.
Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman
agrees that the Fed tends to overreact
to a financial crisis, but that’s better
than doing nothing, which is the mis-
take the Fed made after the 1929 crash.
He offers the analogy of putting out a
fire in a room. “You spray a lot of water
on it [and] the next morning you’ve
got some waterlogged furniture to deal
with. … That doesn’t mean the smart
thing to do would have been to stand
back and watch the room burn.”
Greenspan’s Legacy
The Fed’s response to the October
1987 crash would presage how it would
cope with other threats to U.S. finan-
cial markets. A series of events added
new stresses to financial markets 10
years after the crash. First, foreign
investors fled currency and equity 
markets in East Asian countries in 
mid-1997. Then, Russia defaulted on 
its domestic debt and stopped making
payments on its foreign debt in August
1998. The International Monetary
Fund chose not to help the country 
like it helped Thailand and other 
countries. 
Again, U.S. monetary policy focused
on preventing these stresses from caus-
ing bigger problems — the Fed lowered
the funds rate from 5.5 percent to 
4.75 percent during the fall of 1998.
“Easier money helped sustain the U.S.
expansion — and prevent a global
slump,” wrote Washington Post colum-
nist Robert Samuelson this past
February in an editorial about
Greenspan’s legacy. 
But a series of six rate increases
occurred in 1999 and 2000, partly to
pull liquidity back out of the economy
and partly to address concerns about
inflation that dated back to the mid-
1990s. This tightening may have
helped trip the 2001 recession.
Greenspan’s approach to dealing
with financial crises has raised a 
number of important questions. 
How responsive should the Fed be
when faced with such a crisis — and
how quickly should it revert to pre-
crisis form? Also, how much leeway
should the Fed Chairman be given to
“fine-tune” policy?
This last question is not only 
relevant to how the Fed puts out 
financial fires, it also gets to the 
heart of the Fed’s day-to-day policy-
making. The Fed’s effectiveness
depends on its ability to communicate
its intentions and manage inflation
expectations. 
Some would say that Greenspan
mastered the art of managing 
expectations. It first came into play
during the stock market crash and
would help instill sufficient 
confidence in the Fed’s inflation-
fighting prowess to reduce volatility 
in prices and economic output during
Greenspan’s 18 years as Fed Chairman. 
This is the legacy Greenspan has
left Ben Bernanke. He and other
FOMC members will take a hard look
at setting an explicit inflation target.
In the meantime, they will continue 
to use economic data and their best 
judgment to keep prices stable. RF
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